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DD/I RESEARCH STAFF

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

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SUBJECT: Some Observations on the Revised Edition
of "Military Strategy"

1. On 30 August 1963, fifteen months after the first edition of the Soviet Defense Ministry book "Military Strategy" was issued, a second edition, revised and enlarged, was signed to press.* The previous interval between comprehensive Soviet works on strategy had been 36 years. The second edition of "Military Strategy" was produced by the same group of authors as the first, under the stewardship of Marshal Sokolovskiy, onetime Chief of the General Staff. The formats of both editions are virtually identical; textual revisions, additions and deletions

*The revised version of the book, made available here only a week ago, was first released in the USSR in October, according to a footnote in an article on the U.S. translations (of the first edition) by four of its incensed authors in RED STAR on 2 November 1963. The article vigorously attacked the U.S. editors for "slander" and "falsifications" in their annotated versions of the book. The article showed particular sensitivity over pre-emption as a Soviet strategy (they categorically denied any such thing); escalation from local war ("inevitable" only if the major nuclear powers are drawn in, they insisted); and differences between Soviet political and military leaders and among the military (this notion is preposterous, they said--everybody knows that the CPSU Central Committee decides all important questions of national defense).

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have been made without altering the basic structure of the work. This has made possible a line by line comparison of the two versions. Only the most striking differences in the texts are set forth in this memorandum which is intended simply to acquaint the reader with the appearance of the new work and to offer a preliminary commentary on it.

2. The reasons for publishing a second edition at this time are not entirely clear. While the revised edition has many changes and is thicker than its predecessor by 46 pages, the thrust and substance of the original version remain essentially unchanged. Hence, the revisions in themselves do not seem to warrant republication at this time. For example, while the new edition brings up to date public information on American strategy and capabilities, the revisions do not alter the previous work's emphasis on the magnitude of U.S. military power. Most of the substantive changes, in fact, tend to bear on the periphery of Soviet military doctrine, on questions of a largely political order, rather than on questions of force requirements and the nature of future war. The changes make the work reflect recent developments in the political line, notably in Soviet foreign affairs and intrabloc relations. And while they may sharpen the focus on some matters, they leave other, perhaps still controversial subjects, ambiguous. In any case, this reviewer doubts that the revisions add up to a new landmark in the evolution of Soviet military thought. Indeed, it seems to be more likely the case that the authors used the updated version to reassert their former views on military doctrine at a time when basic Soviet defense policies and programs may be in flux. The authors graciously note that they had received a good deal of useful advice and criticism from colleagues in the USSR, nevertheless they devote half their preface to refuting their critics' recommendations. Finally, perhaps an obvious explanation is also a correct one: the initial supply of 20,000 copies--a small distribution compared to that of other military publications on doctrinal matters--was quickly exhausted. The distribution of the new edition is twice the original.

3. One of the striking accomplishments of the fresh edition was to make the book politically more acceptable on matters peripheral to the book's main theses. Thus, having been sent to press after the signing of the partial test ban treaty, the book acknowledges that event and drops some

of the rather hostile statements about the West carried in the earlier version. The following statement, for example, was excised from the Introduction:

Contemporary state monopoly capitalism is advancing a clearly stated militaristic program and is intensifying all the basic aggressive tendencies of world capitalism.
(p. 3, 1st edition)

And in place of the following paragraph emphasizing the threat of a deliberate NATO attack--

Now, major imperialist forces and weapons which could be used for a surprise nuclear blow, are already deployed and dispersed over vast areas and maintained at a high level of combat-readiness.
(p. 327, 1st edition)--

a paragraph warning of the danger of accidental war has been substituted (p. 364, 2nd edition).

4. The revised edition also reflects recent developments in the intrabloc dispute. Thus, the two derogatory references to the Yugoslavs in the first edition (pp. 199 and 202) have been dropped, as has the single reference to the contribution of the Chinese to military thought--that of Confucius, Sun Tsu and Wu Tsu between the First and Fourth Centuries. At the same time, however, the new version has not added favorable references to Yugoslavia or made any disparaging remarks about the Chinese, such as can be found in Soviet military newspapers and journals. The authors thus tend to assume a neutral stance on these questions, perhaps to avoid having to put out still another edition when the political wind changes.

5. The chapter dealing with U.S.-NATO military strategy and capabilities was subjected to major revisions but these were generally of the order of updating the realistic account given in the original version. Numbers and types of U.S. strategic weapons, existing and programmed through 1966 are thus brought up to date on basis of data openly

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published in the United States. Added for the first time (p. 103) is a note on the warhead yields of the Atlas (up to 3 mgts) Titan (1-4 mgts) and Minuteman (up to 600 kts). (It is noteworthy in this regard that the Soviet civil defense program has been subjecting the Soviet public to a realistic presentation of the effects of high yield nuclear explosions.) Also added are some five solid pages of a not entirely objective discussion of U.S. strategic thought as it has unfolded since June 1962. Here the authors explain the U.S. "counterforce" doctrine, and the weapons and factors required to make it realistic. They draw the now standard conclusion that the doctrine is predicated on a preventive war strategy, and requires a surprise attack to be successful.

6. In the course of discussing U.S. strategic thought, the new version dropped a paragraph suggesting that the presence of great stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the opposing countries tends to promote strategic stability, and that nuclear war would mean "complete mutual annihilation"--thereby, outdoing the "Malenkov heresy." The deleted paragraph read:

They began to understand that when both sides possess very large stockpiles of nuclear weapons and various means of delivering them to targets, primarily strategic means, a general nuclear war holds great risks of complete mutual annihilation. Consequently, the greater becomes the conviction that it is impossible to use them. Thus the growth of nuclear-missile power is inversely proportional to the possibility of its use.
(p. 74, 1st edition)

7. The treatment of the origin of Soviet military doctrine in the revised edition is in keeping with the trend in the past six months or so of stressing the prerogatives of the political leadership in military planning. It will be recalled that during the past year or two there has been reflected in the Soviet military press a thinly-veiled controversy over whether the military or the political leaders

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are better qualified to plan Soviet defenses. That the book has been adjusted to conform to the recent pronounced practice of stressing the prerogatives of the political leaders in the military sphere is seen in the following revisions:

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| (1) | In wartime, therefore, strategic considerations often determine policy.
(p. 26, 1st edition) | In wartime, strategic considerations often reflect and in turn influence policy.
(p. 30, 2nd edition) |
| (2) | Military doctrine is not thought out or compiled by a single person or group of persons.
(p. 49, 1st edition) | The basic positions of military doctrine are determined by the political leadership of the state.
(p. 54, 2nd edition) |

While the old formula (in the second set) detracted from Khrushchev's claims to pre-eminence in the military field, the new formula (also used by Malinovskiy in his pamphlet last November) supports them. An even stronger phrasing of the latter type may be found in the May 1963 pamphlet, "Soviet Military Doctrine," by Col. Gen. N. A. Lomov:

.....The fundamentals of military doctrine are determined by the political leadership of the country, since only it has the jurisdiction and competence to solve problems of military construction....

The revised edition of the book, moreover, does not go as far as the Lomov pamphlet in crediting Khrushchev personally with authorship of the "principal positions" of military doctrine.

8. Some interesting changes have been made in the sections dealing with local war. But these, characteristically, have been more in the realm of politics than military matters; the new edition does not appear to have seriously altered the somewhat ambiguous doctrinal positions set forth in the first version. Like its predecessor, the revised

edition appears to be at cross-purposes with itself on the question of escalation under various conditions. For example, both versions in some places stress the improbability of a localized conflict in Europe or of a large-scale war there limited to conventional weapons, and assert that a local war will inevitably escalate if the major nuclear powers are drawn into it. But elsewhere they discuss local war situations and operations including a hypothetical large-scale non-nuclear "local war" in central Europe, and urge that a place be carved out for local war in Soviet military strategy. The inconsistencies in the book undoubtedly reflect continuing controversy among Soviet military and political leaders on this matter. At the same time, it is clear from the book in both its editions as well as from other open Soviet military publications, that there has been an awakened Soviet interest in the question of applying their own forces in local military crises.

9. As to the political aspects of the local war question, the revised edition has added Africa and Cuba to the list of areas where the imperialists will "most likely initiate aggressive wars." The other areas on the list are the Near and Middle East, Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam. In this regard the singular change in the description of Taiwan as a danger area is noteworthy:

...the island of Taiwan, occupied by the USA, where the latter incites Chiang Kai-shek to provocative actions against People's China...
(p. 206, 1st edition)

...the island of Taiwan, historically Chinese land, on which the Chiang Kai-shek clique and American occupiers are settled...
(p. 225, 2nd edition)

The revision thus appears to be a shade less critical of the United States and tends to transform the Taiwan situation from an active military threat to Communist China into a lesser problem of Irredentism. In conjunction with this, another revision tends to play down the active threat of local war against Bloc countries, and particularly against China:

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....some imperialist cricles, fearing that a world war might mean complete disaster for capitalism,

insist on the conduct of local wars and point out their political advantages. Such a war might also be foisted upon the socialist countries.

(p. 281, 1st edition)

are laying plans for the conduct of local wars in different areas of the world.

(p. 319, 2nd edition)

10. That Soviet doctrine has not yet been worked out on a whole range of questions pertaining to the conduct of possible, future war is made clear in the following paragraph found only in the revised edition:

These questions are subject to polemics. Essentially, the argument is over the basic ways in which future war will be conducted, whether this is to be a ground war with the employment of nuclear weapons as a means of supporting the operations of the ground forces, or a fundamentally new war in which the main means of deciding strategic tasks will be nuclear-rocket weapons.

(p. 367, 2nd edition)

The authors make it clear where they stand in respect to this basic argument. As in their first version, they again score the tendency of certain Soviet military theorists to overestimate the experience of the last war and to apply it mechanically to modern conditions. In the revised version, they add the following statement:

The error in this point of view is that it depreciates the role of rocket-nuclear weapons of strategic designation and underestimates its enormous military possibilities, thereby orienting it to the Ground Forces and to the traditional ways of conducting

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war. The imperialists do not intend to wage war against socialist countries with ground forces. They place their stakes on nuclear weapons, basically the strategic ones...
(p. 368, 2nd edition)

The role of strategic nuclear weapons also appears to be given somewhat greater emphasis vis-a-vis theater warfare, as seen in the following revision:

Strategy uses tactics and operations to verify its assumptions and conclusions.
(p. 11, 1st edition)

...Strategy, having in the past been attained by tactics and operational art, now has the possibility by its autonomous means to attain the goals of the war independent of the outcome of battles and operations.
(p. 21, 2nd edition)

11. As regards the question of numbers of troops, the new version gives added emphasis to the old that more, not fewer, troops are required by modern weapons. Both versions repudiate the "notorious" theory advanced by some of their colleagues of the possibility of waging war with small but technically well-equipped armies. Then each version proceeds as follows:

The advocates of such armies fail to consider that the new equipment, far from reducing the requirements of the armed forces for personnel, increases them. For this reason, massive armies of millions of men will be needed to wage a future war.
(p. 264, 1st edition)

The advocates of such theories fail to consider that the new weapons and new military equipment, far from reducing the requirements of the armed forces for personnel, increases them, both immediately for combat as well as for

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supporting units. The need for a massive army derives from the fact that enormous simultaneous losses from nuclear strikes require great numbers of troops, significant reserves for replenishing the troops and increasing their fighting capabilities. Moreover, the increased scope of the war and the creation, by nuclear strikes, of enormous zones of destruction and radioactive debris require a large number of troops for guarding and defending state borders, rear objectives and communications, and for the elimination of the after-effects of the nuclear strikes. Hence, there cannot be any doubt that future war will involve massive armies of millions of men.
(p. 300, 2nd edition)

Elsewhere in the revised edition, a new paragraph on personnel requirements notes that "not a single state, however strong economically" can support in peacetime an army of the size required in wartime, and will therefore have to count on mobilization in case of war. The Soviet "multi-million man cadre army," a "part of which is kept at constant combat readiness," will nevertheless be "insufficient for conducting war." (p. 291, 2nd edition) Both versions discuss mobilization requirements in the event of war in a subsequent chapter.

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12. As in the first edition, the second reveals an abiding interest among the Soviet military in advanced weapons and the question of military use of outer space. The revised edition for the first time calls attention to U.S. research in the military use of antigravitation, antimatter, plasma and lasers (pp. 394, 405), in addition to reiterating the concern voiced in the original version over preventing the U.S. from gaining superiority in space weapons. New in the second version is the statement that "it is necessary to have suitable means of providing for the timely detection of cosmic apparatuses of the enemy and for their rapid destruction or neutralization." (p. 395) A change in regard to the Soviet ABM capability is noteworthy.

There is a realistic possibility of creating an insurmountable anti-missile defense. (p. 351, 1st edition)

There is a realistic possibility of parrying the blows of enemy rockets. (p. 393, 2nd edition)

13. The section on naval warfare has been filled out somewhat, though probably not to the extent called for by a Soviet naval reviewer of the first edition of the book. Perhaps most noteworthy here is the addition of a claim to an ASW capability sufficient to deal with the Polaris submarine threat:

Atomic submarines with Polaris rockets can be destroyed at their bases by strikes from strategic rockets and long range aviation; at sea, both in crossing the sea and on station, by operations of anti-sub submarines, long-range aviation, and other anti-sub forces and means. The capability to combat missile submarines is now being extended to the full range of seas and oceans. Former coastal ASW systems will now be ineffective against missile-bearing submarines. (p. 399, 2nd edition)

The addition of a reference to amphibious landings by Soviet forces is also noteworthy in view of fresh interest in this subject reflected in recent issues of the Soviet military

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press and journals. According to "Military Strategy:"

In building the naval fleet, consideration is being given the task of providing for combined operations with the Ground Forces, and first of all of providing for amphibious landings.
(p. 313, 2nd edition)

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